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TEN YEARS ON: MILITARY JUSTICE AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE POST-9/11 ERA

Within a day or two after 9/11, as the shock was wearing off, it occurred to me that the
legal fallout of the attacks would be varied and profound. I cannot recall which areas of the
law I thought at the time were most likely to be affected, but certainly they included criminal
law. I also reckoned there would be litigation arising simply from the loss of the buildings
and that these losses would present significant commercial insurance issues. With National
Guard troops posted on the streets and in train stations, it also seemed likely that Posse
Comitatus Act 1 issues would arise.
Based on these early observations, the attacks seemed to furnish the occasion for a new
law review dedicated to examining the 9/11 fallout. My thought was that, unlike normal
law reviews, this one would be designed to expire once things died down. I thought there
might be a few lively years.
Nothing came of it, despite my effort to interest a law school in New York (not New York
Law School) in the idea. On the other hand, existing law reviews have risen to the occasion,
producing a rich post-9/11 literature over the last decade. Entirely new journals have sprung
up, such as the Journal of National Security Law and Policy, on the editorial board of
which I sit.2 While more broadly cast than what I had in mind, many of the Journal’s
offerings fall under the post-9/11 rubric. The last decade has also witnessed the explosive
growth of the blogosphere, where there is no shortage of excellent, rigorous, and pertinent
sites.3
Given this background, I am especially pleased that New York Law School decided two
years ago to co-sponsor this symposium on civil liberties ten years after 9/11 with the
Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies and the American Constitution Society
for Law and Policy, and that the New York Law School Law Review is dedicating this
issue to the program.
For many years, my main area of study and practice has been military law. In this
article, I will assess how 9/11 has influenced the development of law and legal institutions
in that field. In the process, I will at times get out of my lane to offer a few broader
observations.
I.	Introduction

The 9/11 attacks have influenced virtually every aspect of the world of military
law. Part I of this article addresses its effects on military justice, which is the law
1.

18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006).

2.

The first issue of the Journal appeared in 2005. According to an introductory note from Dean Elizabeth
Rindskopf Parker of the University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, “it took the 9/11 attacks
more than a decade [after the fall of the Berlin Wall] to begin the process of awakening a fuller
understanding of the implications of [the end of the Cold War] for our new century.” Elizabeth
Rindskopf Parker, Why a Journal of National Security Law & Policy?, 1 J. Nat’l Sec. L. & Pol’y 1
(2005).

3.

See, e.g., Lawfare: Hard Nat’l Sec. Choices, http://www.lawfareblog.com (last visited Mar. 27,
2011); see also Nat’l Sec. Advisors, http://www.natseclaw.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2011); Am. Univ.
Wash. Coll. of Law, Nat’l Sec. L. Brief, http://www.nationalsecuritylawbrief.com (last visited Mar.
27, 2011); Robert Chesney’s [Nat’l Security L.] Listserv Archive, J. Nat’l Sec. L. & Pol’y, http://chesney.
jnslp.com (last visited April 7, 2011).
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governing the internal discipline of armed forces. Part II considers the Guantánamo
detentions and the military commissions conducted there. Part III summarizes
developments with respect to the rights of military personnel, while Part IV describes
some impacts of 9/11 on the bar. Parts V and VI, respectively, identify instances in
which the military was misused and the effects of 9/11 on the judiciary. This
catalogue is not intended to be exhaustive, but it will give a sense of the pervasive
effects of 9/11. Some are disturbing, such as the Supreme Court’s seeming indifference
to the stately pace of Guantánamo habeas corpus litigation, and a few are modestly
encouraging, if not exactly a cause for celebration, such as the constructive role played
by the Judge Advocates General. In Part VII, I provide some concluding remarks.
Just what were the effects of 9/11 on military justice? It depends on whether the
question is limited to direct effects or includes indirect effects as well. If one includes
the second Gulf War and the war in Afghanistan, the effects have been substantial.
New challenges have faced the conventional military justice system, by which I mean
the system of courts-martial used for ensuring good order and discipline among our
military personnel.4 Despite the fact that a high tempo of military operations tends
to reduce the disciplinary caseload, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have generated
numerous high-profile incidents that have tested the military justice system. These
include well-known cases, such as those that arose at the Abu Ghraib detention
facility in Iraq,5 and others that arose under actual battlefield conditions in both
countries.6 Many observers—myself included—have wondered whether military
commanders were slower than they should have been in referring charges to courtsmartial, and whether court-martial members (i.e., jurors) were too quick to permit
“fog of war” claims to influence their thinking, thus making them slower to convict
and, in the event of a conviction, less likely to impose a harsh sentence.7 Only now
are we at a point where actual outcomes can be evaluated and judgments reached on
these matters, as Marine judge advocate and now-professor Gary D. Solis brilliantly
did after the dust settled in Vietnam.8
One byproduct of the military operations that followed 9/11 was a congressional
attempt to revive the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over civilians. Such
jurisdiction was permitted by Congress until the 1950s, when a string of Supreme
Court cases effectively confined military justice personal jurisdiction to individuals
4.

Courts-martial are governed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Manual for
Courts-Martial (MCM). See generally 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–950 (2006); Manual for Courts-Martial,
United States (2008), http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/mcm.pdf.

5.

See, e.g., United States v. Graner, 69 M.J. 104 (C.A.A.F. 2010); United States v. Harman, 68 M.J. 325
(C.A.A.F. 2010); United States v. Smith, 68 M.J. 316 (C.A.A.F. 2010).

6.

E.g., United States v. Wuterich, 67 M.J. 63 (C.A.A.F. 2008).

7.

The full story remains to be told. See generally William C. Peters, Adjudication Deferred: Command
Responsibility for War Crimes and U.S. Military Justice from My Lai to Haditha and Beyond, 37
Nationalities Papers 925 (2009).

8.

See Gary D. Solis, Military Justice, Civilian Clemency: The Sentences of Marine Corps War Crimes in South
Vietnam, 10 Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 59 (2000); see also Gary D. Solis, Son Thang: An
American War Crime (1997) (focusing on a single incident that took place in 1970 in Vietnam).
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who are in the military 9 (and presumably certain military retirees).10 In 2006, Senator
Lindsey O. Graham, Republican of South Carolina, led the revival effort, eventually
leading to an amendment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to permit
the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over persons serving with or accompanying
an armed force in the field in time of a declared war or a “contingency operation,”11 a
defined term under the UCMJ12 that includes the wars in both Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Given the precedents, this extension of court-martial jurisdiction raises serious
civil liberties issues, and perhaps for this reason the armed forces have been loath to
employ it. A mere handful of cases involving civilian contractor personnel has arisen
in Iraq,13 but the sentences handed down in these proceedings have been so short
that they do not even qualify for normal review in the military appellate courts.14
Other threatened prosecutions collapsed when injunctions were sought in federal
district court in Washington, D.C.15 The Obama administration has trod very
carefully in furthering the implementation of the new law. The 2010 amendments to
the Manual for Courts-Martial cautioned that
9.

See McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278
(1960); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1
(1957); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).

10.

E.g., Hooper v. United States, 326 F.2d 982 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (upholding court-martial jurisdiction over a
retired Navy Rear Admiral); United States v. Hooper, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 637 (1958). The Supreme Court
referred to potential court-martial jurisdiction over retired regulars in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S.
210, 221 (1981). See generally J. Mackey Ives & Michael J. Davidson, Court-Martial Jurisdiction over
Retirees under Articles 2(4) and 2(6): Time to Lighten Up and Tighten Up?, 175 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (2003).

11.

See 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (2006) (amended by the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2007, 120 Stat. 2083 (2006)). The 2006 legislation added the requirement for a
declaration of war, in response to cases that had held the earlier statute could not be applied to Vietnam
since Congress had never declared war there. Id.; United States v. Averette, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 363 (1970).
The 2006 amendment also added the “contingency operations” provision. See 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10).
For a discussion of the expansion of court-martial jurisdiction to contractors, see Eugene R. Fidell,
Criminal Prosecution of Civilian Contractors by Military Courts, 50 S. Tex. L. Rev. 845 (2009).

12.

10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(13) (2006).

13.

See, e.g., Alexandra Zavis, Army Interpreter Sentenced at Court-Martial, L.A. Times, June 24, 2008, at
A3, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/24/world/fg-interpreter24.

14.

For example, in the case noted immediately above, the sentence was five months of confinement. Id. To
be eligible for review by the service court of criminal appeals, a court-martial sentence must be at least a
year of confinement or include a bad-conduct or dishonorable discharge or (in the case of a commissioned
officer) a dismissal. 10 U.S.C. § 866(b)(1) (2006).

15.

E.g., Petitioner’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Price v. Gates, No. 1:09-cv-00106 (D.D.C. Jan.
16, 2009). This action for a writ of habeas corpus was dismissed on January 26, 2009 (ten days after it
was filed), when military authorities advised the petitioner that then secretary of defense Robert M.
Gates had decided to withhold authority for the Air Force to try him by court-martial. See Keith Rogers,
No court-martial for man suspected in spy plane fire, Las Vegas Review-Journal (Jan. 23, 2009), http://
www.lvrj.com/news/38209139.html; John O’Connor, Comment to BIG news: U.S. not to proceed with
charges against civilian contractor, CAAFLOG ( Jan. 26, 2009, 6:30 PM), http://www.caaf log.
com/2009/01/23/big-news-u-s-not-to-proceed-with-charges-against-civilian-contractor/.
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[c]ourt-martial jurisdiction over civilians under the [UCMJ] is limited by the
Constitution and other applicable laws, including as construed in judicial
decisions. The exercise of jurisdiction under Article 2(a)(11) in peace time has
been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States. Before
initiating court-martial proceedings against a civilian, relevant statutes,
decisions, service regulations, and policy memoranda should be carefully
examined.16

No one should expect widespread use of this controversial authority to court-martial
civilians.
II.	The Military and the Guantánamo Detainees

The most significant 9/11 civil liberties issues have, of course, concerned not
Americans in uniform or civilian contractors, but those whom we have detained and
sought to prosecute before military commissions. Setting aside the question of
detention, which has led to an astounding amount of litigation, the revival of the
military commissions stands as one of the major civil liberties legacies of the 9/11
era. The tale is a grim one.
What to do about people captured in the course of operations against al-Qaeda
(which conducted the 9/11 attacks) and the Taliban (which harbored al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan)? The choices were few. One approach was to prosecute those we were
able to capture before a federal district court, as was done with the perpetrators of the
first World Trade Center bombing on February 26, 1993.17 Another alternative was to
prosecute them before general courts-martial, which have authority to try offenses
against the law of war by persons who are subject to the law of war.18 The Bush
administration did not follow that route, even though it had been urged by experts.19
Instead, only two months after 9/11, President George W. Bush issued a Military
16.

Exec. Order No. 13,552, 75 Fed. Reg. 54,263, 54,269 (Aug. 31, 2010), amending Rules for CourtMartial 202(a) (Discussion).

17.

See, e.g., United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming conviction); United States v.
Salameh, 261 F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 2001) (affirming sentence with minor modifications as to fine and
restitution).

18.

10 U.S.C. § 818 (2006).

19.

See generally Jan E. Aldykiewicz & Geoffrey S. Corn, Authority to Court-Martial Non-U.S. Military
Personnel for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed During Internal Armed
Conflicts, 167 Mil. L. Rev. 74 (2001) (proposing that United States place war criminals before general
courts-martial under control of a U.S. commander); Robinson O. Everett & Scott L. Silliman, Forums
for Punishing Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. 509 (1994) (concluding that
American courts-martial are viable alternatives to specially constituted international tribunals for trying
crimes against the law of nations); Neal Katyal, Invent This Wheel!!! Now can we try using courts-martial
for enemy detainees?, Slate (July 11, 2006, 4:41 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2145512/ (arguing that
following the Supreme Court’s decision to strike down President Bush’s military commission system at
Guantánamo Bay, Congress should now seriously consider instituting a courts-martial system); Neal
Katyal, Sins of Commissions: Why aren’t we using the courts-martial system at Guantanamo?, Slate (Sept. 8,
2004, 11:11 AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2106406/ (laying out the benefits of a courts-martial system
as compared to the Bush administration’s use of military commissions).
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Order authorizing the creation of military commissions, 20 a type of military court not
used since the aftermath of World War II.21 These were contemplated by the UCMJ,
but many of the details were not spelled out.22 The Bush commissions were slow to
get off the ground, and eventually, after the Supreme Court found them flawed, 23
Congress stepped in and passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA).24 In
2009, another Military Commissions Act was passed, 25 but to date the government
has prosecuted only a handful of cases under it and the predecessor arrangements.26
Many concerns have been expressed about the use of military commissions.
Should the strict rules of evidence apply, as they do in courts-martial?27 Should
evidence obtained by coercion short of torture be admissible? Should evidence
obtained without Miranda 28 warnings be admitted? What restrictions should be
imposed on the media in attempting to cover military commission trials?29 But one
20. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg.

57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001); Eugene R. Fidell, Military Commissions and Administrative Law, 6 Green Bag
2d 379, 379 n.1 (2003).

21.

See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 597 (2006). In Hamdan, Justice Stevens explained that military
commissions have been used in three situations: (1) as substitutes for civilian courts when martial law
has been declared; (2) as occupation courts to try civilians in the absence of civil government; and (3) “as
an ‘incident to the conduct of war’ when there is a need ‘to seize and subject to disciplinary measures
those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of
war.’” Id. at 595–97 (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1942)). Hamdan involved the third
type.

22.

See 10 U.S.C. §§ 818, 821, 836, 847–48, 850 (2006).

23.

Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557. The Supreme Court had earlier determined that foreign nationals held at
Guantánamo Bay could seek writs of habeas corpus. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). In Boumediene
v. Bush, the Court held that the part of the Military Commissions Act (MCA) that sought to preclude
habeas corpus petitions by Guantánamo detainees was an unconstitutional suspension of the writ. 553
U.S. 723 (2008).

24.

Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006), amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574–614 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).

25.

Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574–614 (2009) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).

26. 1 M.C. (Oct. 2006–June 2009), http://www.wcl.american.edu/nimj/documents/reporter_june19.

pdf ?rd=1; 2 M.C. ( Jan. 2010), http://www.wcl.american.edu/nimj/documents/2MC_Issue2_
January2010.pdf ?rd=1. Military commission decisions are unofficially reported in the Military
Commission Reporter, published by the National Institute of Military Justice.

27.

See 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (Supp. II 2008); compare Fed. R. Evid., with Mil. R. Evid.

28. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring that police officers advise civilians of their

constitutional rights before questioning them).

29. One notable controversy involved the expulsion of four journalists from the military commissions

because they had written articles naming a witness who had previously identified himself in the news
media. The matter was the subject of negotiations between the Department of Defense and the affected
media. See Jeremy W. Peters, Pentagon Eases Some Rules on Guantánamo Coverage, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11,
2010, at A11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/11/us/11gitmo.html. However, the
resulting September 10, 2010 revised “Media Ground Rules” remain unduly onerous and problematic.
See generally Dep’t of Def., Media Ground Rules for Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) (2010),
http://www.defense.gov/news/d20100910groundrules.pdf.
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of the biggest issues concerning military commissions relates to the fundamental
question of whether the so-called “high-value detainees”—those directly involved in
the 9/11 attacks—should be prosecuted before a commission in Guantánamo or in
the federal courts. The Obama administration has wrestled with this, offering in
2009 a set of guidelines for distinguishing the two categories of cases. 30 Attorney
General Eric H. Holder, Jr. was widely criticized in 2009 when he announced that
half of the high-value detainees would be tried in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York.31 He seemed to recede from this position when local
officials in lower Manhattan objected, 32 and the proposal seemed doomed when New
York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg joined in the objections, citing what seemed to
be a wildly inflated cost estimate for courthouse and lower Manhattan security. 33 It
is telling that when Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani was brought from Guantánamo to the
Southern District for a civilian federal trial, the New York Police Department sought
no financial assistance to bolster security around the Foley Square courthouse.34 In
the end, the high value detainees were slated for military commission trials.
What is the civil liberties interest? Since the Civil War, it had been widely
understood that military courts could not be used to prosecute civilians when the
local courts were open and transacting business.35 The Supreme Court applied this
doctrine to curtail—after the fact—the use of military courts in the then Territory of
Hawaii in 1946 after the threat of Japanese invasion had passed.36 Trial in federal
district court affords a variety of constitutional protections not known to military
commissions or courts-martial, such as indictment by grand jury and trial by a
randomly drawn twelve-member jury of one’s peers. It also guarantees an independent
judge protected by life tenure. In contrast, military commission jurors are handpicked
and the presiding judges lack secure tenure required for judicial independence. 37
30. Memorandum from Brad Wiegmann & Colonel Mark Martins to the Att’y Gen. & the Sec’y of Def.

(July 20, 2009), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/law-of-war-prosecutionprelim-report-7-20-09.pdf.

31.

Charlie Savage, Accused 9/11 Mastermind to Face Civilian Trial in N.Y., N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 2009, at
A1, available at http://nytimes.com/2010/01/30/nyregion/30trial.html.

32.

Scott Shane & Benjamin Weiser, U.S. Drops Plan for a 9/11 Trial in New York City, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30,
2010, at A1, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE7DF113FF937A2575
2C1A96F9C8B63.

33.

Al Baker, City Says 9/11 Trials Will Cost $200 Million a Year, N.Y. Times City Room Blog (Jan. 6,
2010, 3:41 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/06/city-says-911-trials-will-cost-200million-per-year/.

34. Devlin Barrett & Sean Gardiner, Terrorism Trial Security Relatively Scaled Back, Wall St. J. (Sept. 21,

2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703305004575504294061702442.html.

35.

Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).

36. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 318–19 (1946).
37.

See Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. § 948i(b) (Supp. III 2009); Manual for Military
Comm’ns R. 504, at II-30 (2010), http://www.defense.gov/news/2010_Manual_for_Military_
Commissions.pdf; Dep’t of Def., Regulation for Trial by Military Comm’ns ch. 5-2(a) (2007).
In Weiss v. United States, the Court held that Fifth Amendment due process does not require fixed terms
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III.	Rights of Military Personnel

Another dimension of civil liberties in the post-9/11 era concerns the liberties of
military personnel. Here a number of issues have emerged. For example, the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan are being fought in the Digital Age. This has generated a
variety of issues. For example, although the military was—or at least seemed to
be—content to have journalists embedded with combat units, it was less happy that
soldiers were sending e-mails and digital photos from the battlespace.38 There was
definitely concern for a time about blogging by G.I.’s. 39 In one episode that created a
firestorm of controversy, a commander in Iraq issued a general order that made it
punishable for women soldiers to become pregnant and required them to be evacuated
from the theater of operations.40 Soon after the order was made public, it was
revoked.41
Military free speech issues have reared their heads in the post-9/11 era as they
have in other times. In 2010, General Stanley A. McChrystal was driven into
retirement when a Rolling Stone article42 reported disparaging comments that
members of his staff had made about Vice President Joseph R. Biden, among others.43
Nothing in the circumstances indicated a violation of the UCMJ prohibition on
of office for military judges in courts-martial. 510 U.S. 163, 164 (1994). There is no doubt that the
Court would rule the same way in the case of military judges assigned to preside over military
commissions. Military commission trial judges have no fixed term under the MCA or the Manual for
Military Commissions. See Regulation for Trial by Military Comm’ns, supra, at ch. 6. They must
be military judges under the UCMJ, but only Army and Coast Guard judges have terms of office by
regulation and these are only for three years; judges from other branches have none. Judges of the Court
of Military Commission Review (CMCR) have undefined terms of at least three years if they are
civilians, but may be reassigned by the Secretary of Defense. Id. at ch. 25-11. Military judges sitting on
that court have terms only to the extent their branch gives them a regulatory term of office, so once
again, only Army and Coast Guard judges serving on the CMCR would have such terms, and then only
short ones. Even those may be abbreviated in some circumstances.
38. See Army Monitors Soldiers’ Blogs, Military.com (Oct. 30, 2006), http://www.military.com/

NewsContent/0,13319,117978,00.html; see Information Security/Website Alert, U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Aug.
6, 2006), http://www.defense.gov/webmasters/policy/infosec20060806.aspx.

39.

See James Dao, Pentagon Keeps Wary Watch as Troops and Their Superiors Blog, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 2009,
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/09/us/09milblogs.html.

40. Pregnant G.I.’s Could Be Punished, N.Y. Times (Dec. 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/20/

us/20general.html; Dep’t of the Army, 3d Infantry Div. Multi-Nat’l Div.-North, General
Order No. 1 (GO #1), ¶ 3(s) (Nov. 4, 2009), http://bobmccarty.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/
MND-N-GO1-4NOV09.pdf (forbidding “[b]ecoming pregnant, or impregnating a Soldier, while
assigned to the Task Force Marne [Area of Responsibility], resulting in the redeployment of the pregnant
Soldier”).

41.

Commander to Rescind a Provision on Pregnancy, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 2009, at A8, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/12/26/us/26military.html.

42.

Michael Hastings, The Runaway General, Rolling Stone (July 22, 2010, 10:00 AM), http://www.
rollingstone.com/politics/news/17390/119236.

43.

Helene Cooper & David E. Sanger, Obama Says Afghan Policy Won’t Change After Dismissal, N.Y. Times,
June 24, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/24/us/politics/24mcchrystal.html.
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speaking contemptuously of the President,44 but the case was a useful reminder that
military personnel—especially commissioned officers—are not as free as civilians are
to speak their minds.45
Other issues regarding expressions of personal beliefs have also arisen. Some
military personnel have objected to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, leading to a
trickle of requests for conscientious objection discharges and related litigation under
a body of case law largely developed during the Vietnam War.46 In a few cases,
soldiers who could not qualify under the standards for conscientious objector status
nonetheless sought to avoid deployment. A leading example of this is First Lieutenant
Ehren K. Watada, who fought the Army to a draw after protracted litigation in the
military and civilian federal courts.47
The military has striven to accommodate Muslim soldiers and sailors with respect
to their worship and ritual foods.48 There is no reason to assume that Dr. Nidal
Malik Hasan, an Army major who has been charged in connection with the multiple
shootings that occurred at Fort Hood, Texas, on November 5, 2009,49 is in any way
typical of the Muslim military population, but coupled with the kind of surprising,
mindless hostility that emerged over plans to build a Muslim cultural center near the
site of the World Trade Center, there is reason to fear that Muslim soldiers may find
themselves under special, and unconstitutional, scrutiny.
Until the delayed effective date of its repeal,50 the military continued to be bound
by the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy Congress enacted in 199351 to prevent President
Clinton from lifting the prohibition on military service by homosexuals. To be sure,
the policy that homosexuality is incompatible with military service was an issue long
before 9/11, but ironically, it may be that military operations in the wake of 9/11
44. 10 U.S.C. § 888 (2006).
45.

E.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758–59 (1974); United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165 (1967)
(rejecting a First Amendment challenge to the UCMJ Article 88 conviction of a junior officer who
carried a sign denouncing President Lyndon Johnson as a “facist” [sic]); see also United States v. Brown,
45 M.J. 389 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (affirming the conviction of a soldier who sought to organize a strike);
United States v. Wilson, 33 M.J. 797 (A.C.M.R. 1991) (affirming the conviction of a soldier who blew
his nose on the American flag).
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47.
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Ehren K. Watada’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus).
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contributed to the growing sentiment in favor of repeal. For instance, the loss of
many Arabic translators as a result of the policy received media attention52 and was
cited in Log Cabin Republicans v. United States.53 Another consideration is the simple
fact that a country that demands repeated deployments of its military personnel, calls
up reservists and National Guard troops, and exercises the “stop loss” power to keep
on active duty those who would otherwise have been discharged, is under special
pressure not to reject or separate those who are willing to serve and are otherwise
qualified. This may be one of the few positive civil liberties developments in the
military world traceable, albeit indirectly, to 9/11.
IV.	The Bar

To look only at the specific kinds of civil liberties issues that have emerged in the
military setting since 9/11 is to tell only half the story. The other half has to do with
lawyers and institutional relationships. The post-9/11 military chronicle includes
both proud chapters and also some for which there is less reason to be proud.
Members of the legal profession have played central roles in many of the salient
post-9/11 events in the military arena. The Bush administration had very few lawyers
in its inner national security circle: neither the President, the Vice President, the
secretary of defense, the secretary of state, nor, for a time, the national security
advisor were attorneys, and former attorney general Alberto R. Gonzales was not
one of our strongest.54 But lawyers played key roles in the events that generated a
civil liberties crisis after 9/11, including former vice president Dick Cheney’s aide
David S. Addington; John C. Yoo and Jay S. Bybee at the Department of Justice;
and William J. Haynes II at the Pentagon.55 Considering the wreckage for which
these attorneys are responsible, it is interesting that none of them has suffered any
real penalty. In fact, it is rather a mixed bag. Mr. Bybee now serves as a U.S. Circuit
Judge, while Mr. Haynes’s nomination to the Fourth Circuit failed.56 Professor Yoo
has returned to the legal academy, and joins this symposium, despite calls to ostracize
52.
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Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Act Policy violates the First and Fifth Amendments and issuing a permanent
injunction barring its enforcement), injunction stayed, Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, No.
10–56634, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 22655 (9th Cir. 2010), application to vacate stay denied, Log Cabin
Republicans v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 589 (2010).

54. See President Bush’s Cabinet, The White House, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/

government/cabinet.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2011). The website includes a list of President Bush’s
cabinet members and hyperlinks to biographies of each member.
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him or revoke his academic tenure.57 The Justice Department found no intentional
wrongdoing in his work on the so-called “Torture Memos,”58 and so far as is known,
neither he nor any of the others noted here have been subjected to bar discipline.
And, calls for Judge Bybee’s impeachment—a highly doubtful proposition, in my
view, for pre–confirmation acts that do not go to the integrity of the confirmation
process itself—have gone unheeded.59
Have our bar institutions failed? This is not the place to pass judgment on any of
these individuals, but rather to suggest that it is asking too much to expect the
professional disciplinary system to stand as a serious bulwark against intrusions on
civil liberties by public officials.
The post-9/11 civil liberties issues have changed the military legal community,
but perhaps less than one might have thought. For example, it is a fact that the Judge
Advocates General (JAG) pushed back against some of the more appalling positions
of the Bush administration.60 Their willingness to do so reflected both their moral
and legal judgments, but also their concern that the Bush administration’s policies
with respect to the treatment of detainees would come back to haunt American
military personnel were the tables ever turned.61 For the sake of the profession, it
would have been preferable for them to have been more open about this, including
submitting their resignations on this basis.62 This is not asking too much, as all of
them would have been able to retire with substantial lifetime benefits. And it would
have been preferable for their opposition to become known directly from them as
opposed to being leaked, as it was, to the New York City Bar Association.63 But
57.
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these are quibbles. The JAGs who pushed back or stood their ground deserve
recognition and the Nation’s thanks.
The post-9/11 era saw a substantial improvement in the institutional power of
the Judge Advocates General (TJAGs). After the unpleasantness over the Torture
Memos had died down, Congress authorized the TJAGs a third star, making them
Lieutenant Generals and Vice Admirals.64 This will in theory give them greater
clout in Pentagon decisionmaking in the future,65 even though there are plenty of
other officers in those pay grades. Efforts were also made to iron out relationships
between the civilian general counsels of the military departments and the TJAGs.
Will the TJAGs become a bulwark for civil liberties? I am certain those who
were personally involved in the struggle with Mr. Haynes over the treatment of
detainees believe they already are. I will only add a small dubitante: when it comes to
reform of the American military justice system, they have not been at the
forefront.66
What of the less senior judge advocates who have been drawn into the defense of
Guantánamo detainees? Many of them displayed moral courage as well as high
professionalism in providing zealous representation to detainees. Some were passed
over for promotion to higher ranks, whether for this or other reasons.67 Equally
impressive has been the commitment of uniformed prosecutors, a number of whom
showed courage in objecting to the pursuit of pointless cases and insisting on ethical

abcny.org/pdf/HUMANRIGHTS.pdf (noting that information about alleged details of interrogation
techniques used at U.S. detention facilities “have come from government officials speaking on the
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conduct and preserving their own prosecutorial independence.68 On the whole, the
post-9/11 era will be—and deserves to be—looked back on as a high point in the
history of American military law.
The civil liberties picture is also a good deal brighter in the military field as a
result of the influence of civilians outside the government. Hundreds of civilian
attorneys volunteered to take up the challenge of representing Guantánamo
detainees.69 They paid a price in terms of the value of their time and considerable
out-of-pocket expenses and were supported by their partners and regular clients.
Efforts to punish them by suggesting that their fee-paying clients find other counsel
failed.70 This is a bright chapter in the story. Would it happen again if comparable
issues arose in a time of serious retrenchment within the profession? I hope we never
have to find out.
V. Misuse of the Military

Issues of improper use of the military have, happily, been few in the post-9/11
years. One matter that has lingered, however, is a claim that “force protection”
personnel at Fort Lewis, Washington, spied on a local anti-war group.71 In addition,
if the cross-border flow of undocumented immigrants continues, it is likely that
military forces will increasingly be looked to for securing the border, under the rubric
of national security in the post-9/11 era.72 Surging drug-war violence on the Mexican
side of the border may have a similar effect.
VI. Effects on the Judiciary

Finally, and perhaps most elusive, is the effect of the post-9/11 military related
activity on the federal courts. There are three aspects to this effect. First, a generation
of Supreme Court Justices has now had to grapple repeatedly with these issues, and
there is every reason to believe that they will continue to do so as Justices Sotomayor
and Kagan settle in to their new responsibilities. The Court was far too slow to act
as the first post-9/11 cases reached it. Specifically, it should have been more aggressive
in holding special terms of court. As the years of detention at Guantánamo have
mounted, the pace of the judicial process has become ever more disappointing and
indefensible, even allowing for judicial restraint.
The second aspect has to do with the global nature of the fallout of post-9/11
military legal activity. Although it has not been widely recognized in the United
68. E.g., United States v. Hamdan, 1 M.C. 78 (May 9, 2008), http://www.wcl.american.edu/nimj/
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States, litigation flowing one way or another from our military activities has kept
courts busy in a number of other countries. A notable example is the litigation in
Canada seeking to compel the Canadian government to make diplomatic
representations on behalf of a military commission defendant, Omar Khadr, because
he was a minor at the time of the offenses with which he had been charged.73
Guantánamo-related issues have also come up in British and other foreign courts.74
Indeed, it was a Law Lord who first prominently described Guantánamo as a “legal
black hole.”75 This is not to say that foreign developments will play any specific role in
the administration of justice here, but they demonstrate yet again that our legal system
does not function in a vacuum. The administration of justice is as likely to attract
foreign interest as are policy pronouncements from the executive branch or
congressional enactments. Mindful that the significance of foreign legal developments
is a matter on which the Justices have widely varying orientations,76 some at least will
find foreign developments in this area worthy of consideration even if they never
actually alter an outcome. We are not alone, and have much to learn from foreign
judges as well as other international actors such as the International Committee of the
Red Cross, which plays a central role in administration of the Geneva Conventions.77
Third, many federal district judges have found themselves drawn into post-9/11
matters related to the military, as the responsibility has fallen to them to hear and
decide the numerous habeas corpus cases arising from the Combatant Status Review
Tribunals and, more recently, the detentions at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan.78
As trial judges, they have had a unique opportunity to evaluate “up close and
personal” the government’s evidence and decisionmaking. Given the government’s
uneven track record in these cases,79 one is tempted to assume that the effect would
be an erosion of the confidence these judges would otherwise be inclined to place in
government decisionmaking and litigation claims. This too is impossible to measure,
but it seems a not-unlikely outcome, with potentially significant implications for
other areas of judicial review of agency action involving the military and claims of
national security.
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VII. Conclusion

Some bullets do their worst damage not at the point of entry but when they
encounter tissue and bone within the body. So it may be with the aftermath of 9/11.
Certainly in the part of the legal forest with which I have chiefly been concerned,
the 9/11 shell has tumbled in ways that have caused serious internal injuries. But our
legal institutions—tempered by the experience of the last decade—are robust enough
to survive those injuries, and will continue to evolve and, I hope, gain strength as the
legal fallout of 9/11 continues and as new aspects of the post-9/11 era come under
examination. It is incumbent on all of us to ensure that outcome. With wisdom,
effort, and luck, we may not even need another such symposium in 2021, even if
experience suggests otherwise.
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